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ABSTRACT
The increased consensus among historians that the emergence of a market revolution
engendered widespread economic, political, and social changes throughout the second quarter of
nineteenth-century America has brought a number of provocative questions to bear on the
antebellum South. Among the most provocative is the assertion that during the 1830s, a strain of
reform-minded southern planters took it upon themselves to integrate the regions subsistence
farmers into the market economy. The historian Harry Watson has asserted that a small, but
influential, group of southern planters sought to confront Dixie’s dilemma of pursuing a modern
economy without cutting ties with the archaic and brutal system of slave labor. For these
forward-thinking planters the promotion of internal improvements represented the most logical
strategy for accomplishing such disparate goals.
Mississippi provides and excellent location to perform a test case. Specifically, this study
will examine events in Mississippi beginning 1820, at the time of the state capitol’s relocation to
Jackson, until the economic crash of 1837. My purpose is to seek out attitudes and behaviors
found in Watson’s study, without overlooking events and circumstances particular to life in
Mississippi during the 1820s and 1830s.

iv

INTRODUCTION
In an essay published in 1996 historian Harry L. Watson attempted to integrate the
antebellum South into national economic transformations resulting from what is widely labeled
as a market revolution in America. Between the periods of the Revolution and the Civil War,
primarily during the Jacksonian Era, the market revolution influenced all spheres of politics,
economics, and religion bringing about a multitude of cultural changes in society and ushering in
a modern capitalist age. However, Watson suggests, “The economic and cultural circumstances
of the South make clear…that the regional impact of commercialization was highly uneven.”1
The emerging market linked “farmers, planters, and merchants to national and
international patterns of production and trade, laying the robust foundations of industrial power
and creating commercial and financial institutions essential to a dynamic capitalist society.”
From the time of the Democrats contentious battles with Whigs over national economic policies
to Abraham Lincoln’s presidential election, the market influenced “fundamental shifts in the way
American people conducted their lives and constructed their relationships with one
another…shaping many of the rifts, conflicts, and inequalities that divided them.”2 Put another
way, the market revolution highlights those who welcomed changes engendered by
industrialization and those who resisted.
A notable drawback is that the market revolution is not a historical event. When
Democrats cast their votes in the presidential election of 1828 they were not voting against the
social phenomenon of a market revolution—they were voting for Andrew Jackson. While
1

Harry Watson, “Slavery and Development in a Dual Economy: The South and the Market Revolution,” in Melvyn
Stokes and Stephen Conway, eds, The Market Revolution in America: Social, Political, and Religious Expressions,
1800-1880 (Charlottesville, 1996), 44.
2
Christopher Clark, “The Consequences of the Market Revolution in the American North,” in Stokes and Conway,
23.
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analytical constructs assist historians in organizing and classifying historical events into
manageable frameworks, they also have the negative effect of imposing ahistorical designs on
the past. However, the market revolution does provide a suitable system of synthesizing such
disparate events as the division and commoditization of labor, the Second Great Awakening of
the 1830s, and the unresolved tensions between capitalism and democracy.
Scholars’ attention to the market revolution will inevitably lead directly to explanations
of societal changes, primarily in the industrialized North, while overlooking the agrarian South.
If the market revolution is understood as the origin of modern capitalism in America, then it is
easy to understand why scholars face such difficulty integrating the South.
While the North’s financial and industrial enterprises prospered under a system of “free labor,”
the South remained largely an agrarian society built upon slave labor. A less obvious distinction
between the two regions may be found in the South’s “dual economy.” Northern financial
institutions, mercantile enterprises, textile mills, even farming, fall under the nexus of one single
market based economy, while the South, according to some historians, hosted two separate
economies.
Cotton planters’ dependence on national and international markets was no different than
that of any northern merchant, which resulted in planters’ acceptance of the realties of the
marketplace—both good and bad. But there were others who opposed the uncertainty of the
market and remained isolated from its influences. Subsistence farmers living throughout the
South rejected the enticements of the market, choosing a modest life in return for personal
autonomy. For those independent farmers the risks of entering the volatile market outweighed

2

its rewards. The South’s dual economy coupled with its brutal and archaic practice of slave
labor determined its idiosyncratic ties to the market revolution.3
Harry Watson’s essay “Slavery and Development in a Dual Economy: The South and the
Market Revolution” is an imaginative and complex attempt to demonstrate how southerners—
especially planters—reconciled their embrace of a modern economy while promoting the cruel
practices of chattel slavery within a dual economy. In his study of antebellum North Carolina,
Watson finds evidence that reform minded politicians and planters understood the shortcomings
of the dual economy and sought to remove it as a barrier to modernization.
Edward Lee Winslow, the president of a plank road under construction in western North
Carolina, comprehended better than most the importance of embracing economic progress—
especially transportation. Winslow calculated that farmers living throughout the backcountry
would benefit greatly by traveling by road to save time, while the volume of traffic on roads
might increase by ten to twelve percent. More importantly, improved transportation might bring
more farmers to market increasing the overall wealth of the region. In a sanguine message
Winslow declared, “Man was placed on the earth to subdue and conquer it..., and there are no
barriers which Nature has erected, which may not be overcome with energy and exertion.
Improve and cheapen the means of transportation,—relieve the productive labor of the country of
the evils arising from bad roads,—give a quick and healthful circulation through all the arteries
of trade,—and raise the value of all descriptions of property, to say nothing of the blessings of
the improvement in the social and religious condition of the population…”4

3

Steven Hahn, The Roots of Southern Populism, Yeoman Farmers and the Transformation of the Georgia
Upcountry, 1850-1890, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); Morton Rothstein, “The Antebellum South as a
Dual Economy: A Tentative Hypothesis,” Agricultural History 41 (October, 1967).
4
Watson, “Slavery and Development in a Dual Economy”, 43.
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Winslow’s optimism is representative of most nineteenth-century champions of internal
improvements. While the economic advantages were self-evident, promoters always emphasized
the cultural advantages that networks of transportation might bring to isolated, rural outposts. Of
course enthusiasm often masked a defensive posture among advocates for internal
improvements.
Watson notes Winslow’s “defensiveness and frustration” at the time of his statements,
and asks, “Why, as late as 1850, were some southern Americans apparently still indifferent to the
benefits of internal improvements?”5 The answer, of course, is the South’s dual economy and
the apprehension it sustained among independent producers who feared the uncertainties of the
market. Watson agrees that sections of the South had already been linked to the Atlantic market
by the seventeenth century, while others remained isolated as late as the middle of the nineteenth
century. Overtime, reformers worked to accelerate change and bring isolated parts of the South
into the sphere of the market, which promised to “cement thereby the loyalties of
nonslaveholding whites to the threatened institution of African slavery.”6
Watson’s assertions are as compelling as they are contentious. The suggestion that an
organized group of “reform minded” planters actively sought to integrate backcountry farmers
into national markets to promote the overall wellbeing of slavery in the South is certainly
stimulating, but also raises many questions. The most important question Watson’s essay raises
is who else, besides those reformers living in North Carolina, promoted internal improvements
with the intent to encourage staple crop production and slave ownership among subsistence
farming communities?

5
6

Ibid,44.
Ibid, 44.
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A number of factors must be in place to test Watson’s ideas in other states. First, any test
case must begin within the boundaries of a southern state before the Civil War ensued. Second,
at least two distinct geographic regions within a single state must be compared, and the
demographics and attitudes of the citizens living within those separate regions must reflect
patterns of thought and behavior similar to those found in Watson’s North Carolina. Third,
public debates and tensions over the construction of internal improvements are a necessity.
Finally, all of these factors must be considered within the context of growing national and local
concerns over the present and future conditions of slavery, beginning in earnest, around the time
of Andrew Jackson’s presidency.
For all of these reasons antebellum Mississippi provides and excellent location to perform
a test case. Specifically, this study will examine events in Mississippi beginning 1820, at the
time of the state capitol’s relocation to Jackson, until the economic crash of 1837. Of course,
Mississippi is its own state and any comparison to other southern states must not be too rigid.
My purpose is to seek out attitudes and behaviors found in Watson’s study, without overlooking
events and circumstances specific to life in Mississippi during the 1820s and 1830s.
The importance of Watson’s essay is evident in its suggestion that “the reformers
pronouncements reveal a bitter struggle on the part of proslavery ‘progressives’ to ‘modernize’
the South by bringing its yeomanry population under the sway of commercial agriculture and the
bourgeois values of hard work and self improvement.” As a result “…southern reformers would
have abolished the dual economy, recruited the yeomanry to wider slave ownership and greater
commercial production, and ultimately pushed the plantation system into the South’s remotest

5

corners.”7 Implicit in Watson’s view is a need among slave owning elites to buttress the
institution of slavery from increased scrutiny and attacks. Planters and politicians alike knew
well what “wider slave ownership” meant to the future of the South.

7

Ibid, 59
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SECTIONALISM
The idea of a unified and distinct South has received increased scrutiny over the years,
prompting some scholars to question the future of southern history, and presumably southern
historians. As one scholar has written, “The very story of the south is a story of unresolved
identity, unsettled and restless, unsure and defensive. The South, contrary to so many words
written in defense and in attack, was not a fixed, known, and unified place but a place of constant
movement, struggle, and negotiation.”1
The earliest interpretations of a monolithic South have been assaulted on all fronts,
resulting in new interpretations and a medley of fresh curiosities for scholars to explore.2 New
findings have revealed a South, “that is more complicated than the stories we tell about it.”3 But
despite the enthusiasm generated by new avenues of study emphasizing the importance of class,
gender, and race, the history of a “more complicated” South continues to engender frustration.
Threadbare generalities and order have been replaced with a fragmented body of
literature that borders on incoherence, often bewildering the most dedicated scholars in the
profession. While historians are encouraged to embrace the complexities of the past and relish
the uncoiling of twisted facts, it is evident that scholars of Southern history strain to make sense
of the region’s peculiarity and ambiguity. For this reason many of the most influential studies in
the last three decades have focused attention on specific southern states, steering clear of
1

Allen Pred, Making Histories and Constructing Human Geographies: The Local Transformation of Practice,
Power Relations, and Consciousness (Boulder, Westview, 1990)
2
The number of influential works is too diverse and vast to list here. For one of the more recent and cogent
demonstrations of a diverse South during the antebellum era, see William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion:
Secessionists at Bay 1776-1854 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). Early influential works include, David
Potter, The South and the Sectional Conflict (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968), and Michael
Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850s (New York and London: Norton, 1978).
3
Edward L. Ayers, “What We Talk About When We Talk About the South,” in Edward L. Ayers, Patricia Nelson
Limerick, Stephen Nissenbaum, and Peter S. Onuf, All Over the Map: Rethinking American Regions (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 81.
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attempts to generalize about the region as a whole. By discussing politics and economics, or
cultural matters, local studies have confronted most of the troublesome questions facing scholars
of the South. While the findings have been significant, the limited geographic scope of such
studies leave many far reaching questions unanswered, and any promise of synthesis in doubt.4
The history of antebellum Mississippi, specifically the political and economic history of
the state from the 1820s up until the economic depression of 1837, illustrates many of the issues
discussed in previous local studies, but also demonstrates its own unique experiences that fail to
blend neatly into an all encompassing history of the South. Popular topics include: intrastate
antagonism, class stratification, the pervasive impact of a market based economy, the debate over
whether or not antebellum southerners engaged in a capitalist economy or pre-capitalist
paternalism, allegiances to national political parties, the hegemony of planters, the obscurity of
yeoman, the tragic struggles and heroic efforts of four million slaves, and the centrality of
slavery—and its defense—in southern politics.5

4

Some of the most insightful local studies of social tension and political change in antebellum, see J. Mills
Thornton III, Politics and Power in a Slave Society: Alabama, 1800-1860 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1978); Harry L. Watson, Jacksonian Politics and Community Conflict (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1981); Lacy K. Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism: The South Carolina Upcountry, 1800-1860
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Stephanie McCurry, Master of Small Worlds: Yeomen Households,
Gender Relations, & the Political Culture of the Antebellum South Carolina Low Country, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1995). For several titles that address changes after the Civil War and are particularly relevant to
this study, see Steven Hahn, The Roots of Southern Populism, Yeoman Farmers and the Transformation of the
Georgia Upcountry, 1850-1890, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); Michael Wayne, The Reshaping of
Plantation Society: The Natchez District, 1860-1880, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990).
5
For discord between various southern states, see William W. Freehling, Road to Disunion. On the subject of class
conflict in the South, see Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism, Harry L. Watson, “Conflict and Collaboration:
Yeoman, Slaveholders, and Politics in the Antebellum South,” Social History, 10 (October, 1985): 273-298, and J.
William Harris, Plain folk and Gentry in a Slave Society: White Liberty and Black Slavery in Augusta’s Hinterlands
(Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1985). The best synthesis on the impact of market forces in the
antebellum South is, Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1991); also Gavin Wright, The Political Economy of the Cotton South: Households, Markets, and
Wealth in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Norton,1978). Regarding “paternalism”, see Eugene Genovese, The
Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of the Slave South (New York: Vintage Books,
1965); Roll Jordon, Roll: The World the Slaves Made (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974). For capitalism,
see James Oakes, Slavery and Freedom: An interpretation of the Old South (New York: Oxford University Press,
1989). On political allegiances, see Holt, The Politics of 1850; William J Cooper’s, The South and the Politics of
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By the 1820s the inhabitants of Mississippi had already begun to engage in internal
sectional disputes, which exposed class stratifications and dictated allegiances to national party
politics. Clearly market forces were already at work along the Mississippi River, illustrated by
the disproportionate accumulation of wealth among the river counties. The territory’s first
settlers recognized the promising opportunities that awaited them along the Mississippi River,
leaving the lands to the east unsettled. Those who could not compete economically, or arrived
later, were forced to settle to the east of the river counties, where the soil was less fertile and
prosperity uncertain.
Situated along, or near, the banks of the Mississippi River, the five river counties
dominated the economic and political landscape of Mississippi throughout most of the 1820s.
Consisting of Wilkinson, Adams, Jefferson, Claiborne, and Franklin counties, the river region’s
elites enjoyed fabulous wealth and decisive influence in state politics. Although prosperity took
time, the earliest settlers of the river counties managed to carve a civilized society out of a
frontier wilderness.
The oldest and most prominent of these Lower Mississippi Valley settlements was the
town of Natchez. Named for the Natchez Indians, the town rested along the lofty bluffs
overlooking the river and quickly established itself as a pivotal trading post in the West.6 By the
1720s settlers of mostly French descent were turning out significant quantities of indigo, rice,
Slavery: 1828-1856 ( Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1978). On the social dominance of planters, see
James Oakes, The Ruling Race: A History of American Slaveholders (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).
For a classic study of yeoman in the South, see Frank L. Owsley, Plain Folk of the South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University, 1949); for the best recent study, see Steven Hahn, The Roots of Southern Populism. For two
distinct interpretations of slave experience, see Kenneth Stamp, The Peculiar Institution (New York: Vintage Books,
1956); Genovese, Roll Jordan Roll. Finally, the clearest argument for the preponderance of slavery’s defense in
southern politics is William Cooper, Liberty and Slavery: Southern Politics to 1860 (New York: Knopf, 1983).
6
The Natchez Indians established upwards of sixty villages up down the Lower Mississippi Valley stretching three
hundred miles to the north of where the town of Natchez stands today. For details into the early history of the
Natchez District see D. Clayton James, Antebellum Natchez (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968),
1-2.
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cotton, pitch, and timber, all to be exported to domestic and world markets. The trade of horses,
acquired from the Spanish in Texas, was especially lucrative and critical to the commercial
successes of Natchez and its unrelenting competition with markets in New Orleans and Mobile.
By the middle 1720s Natchez was not only emerging as center of trade, but also showing
promise as a stable settlement as its population and wealth began to climb.
Reports in 1723 reveal a populace of 303, including over one hundred black slaves; by
1777 totals had swelled to 713 including 280 slaves. Predictably, the amount of cleared land for
domestic and agricultural use increased as the population of the river counties continued to
swell.7 By 1800 the population of what was now referred to as the Natchez District exceeded
four thousand inhabitants and showed few signs of receding. But regardless of the steady growth
and expansion of the District, Natchez remained very much a frontier community.8
Before 1796 very little cotton was exported from Natchez and cultivators chose to expend
their efforts growing tobacco and indigo instead. It is well known that the introduction of Eli
Whitney’s cotton gin greatly impacted the production of cotton throughout the south, and
Mississippi was no different. The once primitive economic life of the Natchez District soon
subsided, and its residents began to evince the modern behaviors and attitudes exhibited among
market oriented regions of the South.
By 1803 the United States’ opportune purchase of the Louisiana Territory precipitated
greater changes throughout the Mississippi region. The acquisition of Louisiana immediately
provided the river counties with a secure political future and removed the threat of interference
from foreign states. The purchase also accelerated the transformation of the river counties from
a wilderness outpost, and improved the exportation of goods along the Mississippi River—
7
8

Ibid, 7-9.
Charles S. Sydnor, A Gentleman of the Old Natchez District (Durham: Duke University Press, 1938), 15.
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including cotton.9 William Claiborne, a Mississippi historian and editor of the Mississippi Free
Trader in 1840 noted, “After the acquisition of the country by the Americans the population
increased very rapidly, and the Spanish and other foreign classes as rapidly disappeared.”10
Stability and security also resulted in an increase in immigration, which in turn brought
diversity and a measure of sophistication to the river counties. As historian Charles Sydnor
writes, “Life began to move at a higher plane” and the “the raw conditions of life of the pioneer
had bound his thoughts and activities to supplying the basic needs of physical life.”11 Naturally,
“The inhabitants of the Natchez region were experiencing about the turn of the century a notable
upward movement in civilization…Cotton had become a sturdy economic foundation, and the
acquisition of the region by the United States had given promise of a more stable political
future.”12 With French and Spanish intrusions eliminated and the uncertainties of the frontier
dispelled, the Natchez District’s planters were free to move out of the shadows of the wilderness
and self-assuredly look forward to a civilized society in which to build.
By the time of Mississippi’s admission to the Union in 1817, a select group of Natchez
District planters enjoyed a disproportionate amount of wealth and political influence. The
prosperity of Natchez itself was visibly on display for all to see, and symbolized the region’s
commercial promise. But the great planters, merchants, and professional men could not
anticipate the effects their success had on those who lived on the periphery of the plantations and
counting houses. One historian contends that the early territorial era produced a relatively fluid
social structure where mobility between the classes was “common.” But the extraordinary

9

Ibid, 17-18.
J.F.H. Claiborne, Mississippi as a Province, Territory, and State (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University press,
1964), 530.
11
Ibid, 19.
12
Sydnor, A Gentleman of the Old Natchez District, 18.
10
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growth of the cotton market throughout the 1820’s had a profound impact on life along the
Mississippi and by the end of the decade, “the growth of urbanization had produced not only
some degree of order and sophistication at Natchez, but also a tendency toward class
stratification.”13
Residents of Natchez and its surrounding areas understood all too well the allure of the
cotton market and went to great lengths to capture their piece of prosperity. Joseph H. Ingraham,
a New Englander and faculty member of Jefferson College in near by Washington, noted the
feverish ambition of Natchez residents when he wrote, “A plantation well stocked with hands, is
the ne plus ultra of every man’s ambition who resides at the south. Young men who come to this
country, to make money, soon catch the mania, and nothing less than a broad plantation, waving
with the snow white cotton bolls, can fill their mental vision.”14
Another northern immigrant ,as well as, future governor and Southern Rights vicepresidential nominee, John A. Quitman could not believe his eyes when he disembarked from a
steamer December 3, 1821 and stepped out onto the “oldest” and most “infamous” section of
Natchez referred to as “Under-the-Hill.”15 Quitman immediately noticed the social and
economic sway the Natchez aristocracy held over the region. By the time Quitman arrived in
1821 Natchez was still considered the political center of Mississippi politics; after all it was the
capital of the state. But word had spread that the political dominance of the region was in

13

James, Antebellum Natchez, 137.
Joseph H. Ingraham, The South-West, by a Yankee vol.1 (New York, 1835), 84-86.
15
Robert E. May, John A. Quitman: Old South Crusader (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University,
1985), 19. Like Ingraham, John Quitman immigrated from the northeast, leaving behind his native Hudson River
community of Rhinebeck, New York for the prospects of the Southwest.
14
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jeopardy and the seat of government might be relocated to a more central location, farther east, to
satisfy the emerging eastern settlements.16
Regardless of what rumors may have been circulating at the time, Quitman felt confident
about his prospects after spending several days acquainting himself with all of Natchez’ s civic
amenities, including a three-story brick hospital, a coffeehouse, reading rooms, and “other
symbols of cultural and social progress.”17 Quitman was seduced by the grandeur and
extravagance of the plantation households located outside Natchez, removed from the mosquito
infested swamps along the river. He noted that during yellow fever season, certain plantation
owners accommodated residents who had fled town to avoid the risk of infection. Once settled
in the lavish confines of the plantation, the townspeople enjoyed the hospitality of their hosts as
they sipped mint juleps after breakfast, followed by riding and fishing in the afternoon. This
“indolent, yet charming life” must have seemed like a dream to those unaccustomed to such
leisure and luxury. While such privilege was far from common, over forty families in Natchez
alone enjoyed similar standards of living, not to mention those plantation households scattered
throughout the river counties.18
In his travels throughout the South in the 1850s Frederick Law Olmsted paid a visit to
Woodville, Mississippi, located in the extreme southwest corner of the state in Wilkinson
County. Bordered to the north by Adams County (Natchez) Woodville was representative of the
planter society along the banks of the Mississippi. In May of 1854 Olmsted recorded in his
travel journal, “The plantations are all large…No poor white people live upon the road, nor in all
16

The relocation of the state capital in 1823 played a major role in Mississippi’s internal disagreements and is
particularly important in this study. The relocation of the capital to Jackson and the emergence of the eastern piney
woods region as a major political factor in Mississippi politics will be discussed in greater detail in the following
chapters.
17
May, John A. Quitman: Old South Crusader, 20.
18
Ibid, 22.
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this country of rich soils are they seen, except en voyage. In a distance of seventy-five miles I
saw no houses without negro-cabins attached, and I calculated that there were fifty slaves, on
average, to every white family resident in the country under my view.”19
Olmsted’s assessment of the planter’s domination was accurate and his conclusions are
supported by the steady increase of improved lands in Adams County from 1820 to 1860. By
1850 seventy percent of farms had 200 hundred or more acres of improved land; in 1860 seventy
eight percent of farms contained 200 or more acres of improved land. During this same period
farms with 1,000 or more acres of improved land increased from 11 percent to 14 percent.
Similarly, non-slave land holdings in the county dwindled from 48 to 22 between 1850 and 1860,
while slaveholder’s farms increased from 133 to 209. Naturally, cotton production soared during
this remarkable period of growth.20
As Frederick Olmsted traversed the “uneven” yet “well engineered” roads north of
Woodville he not only observed the opulence of the region’s plantations, but also took the time
to interview some of its residents. Before leaving Woodville, Olmsted asked a local, “What sort
of country is it, then, between here and Natchez?” The reply came in an unmistakably blustery
tone, “Big plantations, sir. Nothing else, Aristocrats, Swell –heads, I call them, sir. Nothing but
swell-heads, and you can’t get a night’s lodging sir. Beyond the ferry, I’ll be bound, a man
might die on the road ‘fore he’d get [a] lodging with one of them.” Working up to a fever pitch
the resident warned, “You’ll take note of ‘em in Natchez. You can tell them by their walk. I
noticed it yesterday at the Mansion House. They sort o’ throw out their legs as if they hadn’t got

19
20

Frederick Law Olmsted, The Cotton Kingdom, ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger Sr. (The Modern Library, 1984), 411.
James, Antebellum Natchez, 149.
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strength enough to lift ‘em and put them down in any particular place. They do want so bad to
look as if they weren’t made of the same clay as the rest of God’s creation.”21
Olmsted observed a class consciousness in Mississippi all too familiar to his own New
York. The region’s planters and financiers projected themselves as leaders of the community,
often resulting in imperious attitudes and haughty behavior. The Natchez elite’s snobbery is
particularly infamous because, “The singular fact is that regardless of occupation this Natchez
aristocracy was homogeneous at the start, and it became more homogeneous and caste-conscious
through…intermarriage.” Natchez as a community “seemed too animated by a common desire
to build stately homes, to furnish them lavishly, and to ensure their retention by their own
kinsmen.”22
Clearly the foundation for such economic and social dominance in the 1850s found its
origins back in the 1820s when established planting families held the majority of land, slaves,
and social standing throughout the state.23 But despite the prominence of the District’s elite,
there were others. While the population of slaves declined in urban centers throughout the
South, the opposite was true of Natchez. From 1810 to 1860 the number of slaves in Natchez
increased from 459 to 2,131. The rise in slaveholding took place primarily among middle and
upper class business owners. Yet, “Little is known about slavery within the city limits.”24 What
seems apparent is that whites and slaves coexisted in relative harmony, with few incidents.
Much of Natchez’s free labor consisted of young men bound to their masters.
Predictably, apprentices earned little, trading their time and energy for room and board, as well
as, vocational training. Once apprentices fulfilled the terms of their contract, they were often
21

Olmsted, The Cotton Kingdom, 415-416.
Hodding Carter, Lower Mississippi (New York: Rinehart & Company Inc. 1942), 235.
23
Ibid, 149.
24
James, Antebellum Natchez, 171.
22
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hired by their former masters as printers, weavers, blacksmiths, bricklayers, tailors, and inn
keepers, earning $150 to $500 annually. While apprentices may not have intermingled with
middle and upper class citizens, they did not suffer denigration for their modest status. Public
condemnation was reserved for those who earned their living trading slaves and operating
prostitution houses. Because of its location along the river, Natchez attracted a large number of
slave traders passing through on their way to the markets in New Orleans. The river town also
attracted its fair share of wanderers, runaways, even criminals, who patronized the local saloons
and brothels. The gentry reserved their harshest ridicule for these undesirables.25
The middle class consisted mostly of small farmers and merchant capitalists. Bankers,
wholesalers, and commission merchants managed to earn enough wealth to be considered part of
Natchez’s upper class but, “The social distinctions of the time which separated middle-class from
the elite are impossible to define.”26 It has been suggested that a reasonable, quantifiable
delineation is $50,000 in real or personal property, and slaveholdings of twenty or more. 27 Yet
these figures are arbitrary, and provide only a guideline to the social composition of the Natchez
elite. Furthermore, the figures give no clear indication to the pecuniary demarcation that set
middle and lower class citizens apart. It is therefore difficult to judge the limits of social
interaction between higher and lower orders of Natchez.
Also, little evidence suggests any great tension existed between the elite planters and the
middle and lower classes of Natchez. While the class structure of Natchez was typical of
antebellum southern towns, it possessed unique characteristics because of its location along the
banks of the Mississippi River. Natchez demonstrated a commercial and financial element that

25

Ibid, 160.
Ibid, 165.
27
Ibid, 165.
26

16

most towns in the southwest, with the exception of Mobile and New Orleans, had yet to create by
the 1820s. It is plausible that class conflict was mitigated by the fact that Natchez failed to
develop into a city, and its economy lacked a certain industrial quality that has often fomented
enmity between laborers and business owners throughout history. While “swell heads” may
have walked the streets of Natchez, one may conclude—with a degree certainty—that the town
enjoyed relative social harmony among its various classes. But sectional tensions were beginning
to fester between the river counties and their neighbors to the east, which promised to unsettle
the state’s internal politics
In 1830 seven counties accounted for the Natchez District, which made up only 34
percent of Mississippi’s white population, but owned 65 percent of the slaves, paid 69 percent of
the taxes, and possessed 78 percent of the appraised property in the state.28 Based on the socioeconomic character of the Natchez District, many of its inhabitants were market oriented and
espoused most of the economic policies of the National Republicans, and later, the American
Whig party. It has been suggested that, “The economic demarcation between the parties’
constituencies was especially clear in the number of southern states because soil types varied
from region to region and wealthy and poor counties were separated geographically…regional
antagonisms therefore often reinforced the different economic needs and values of Democratic,
National Republican and Whig voters.”29 Similar patterns emerged throughout Mississippi
during the 1820s and 1830s.
While wealthy planters in the southwest enjoyed the benefits of the river, access to the
South’s largest commercial center (New Orleans), and the rich and fertile soils of the river basin,
28
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their neighbors to the east struggled to erect a suitable society of their own. It should be noted
that while the most influential planters and bankers of the river counties considered themselves
stanch members of the National Republican and Whig parties , they did not necessarily support
all of the national programs championed by the party’s leaders.30 Conversely, the more rural
region northeast of Adams County did not support the national Whig party, turning instead to
Andrew Jackson’s Democrats.31
By the 1820s seventeen counties lay to the east of the Natchez District. The first ten,
known as the piney woods, were officially acquired during the War of 1812. Located directly
east of the Natchez District the piney woods, primarily inhabited by subsistence farmers,
possessed poor soil for staple crops.
Frederick Law Olmsted could hardly ignore the disparity between the prosperous
plantations along the river counties and the squalid settlements of central Mississippi. Upon
arriving at a residence to seek lodging for the evening Olmsted observed, “The house was all
comprised in a single room, twenty-eight by twenty-five feet in area…no windows at all. Two
bedsteads, a spinning wheel, a packing-case, which served as a bureau, cupboard, made of rough
hewn slabs, two or three deer-skin seated chairs, a Connecticut clock…constituted all the visible
furniture, either useful or ornamental in purpose.”32 After entering the dwelling Olmsted noted
his peculiar reception by its inhabitants, “The woman of the house sat sulkily in a chair tilted
30
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back and leaning against the logs, spitting occasionally at the fire, but took no notice of me,
barely nodding when I saluted her.”33
Statistics from 1830 show that the piney woods region represented twenty eight percent
of the white population, owned fourteen percent of the slaves, paid thirteen percent of the taxes,
and possessed 15 percent of Mississippi’s appraised property. 34 The piney woods district shared
a community interest with its interior neighbors including the rapidly developing settlements east
of the Mississippi River situated between the Yazoo, Big Black, and Pearl rivers.
Similarly, a third settlement known as the “New Purchase” established seven counties to
the northeast of Natchez. By 1830 the “New Purchase” counties accounted for thirty percent of
the state’s white population, eighteen percent of the black slave population, but possessed only
four percent of Mississippi’s property, and paid only thirteen percent of its taxes.35
By the1830s settlements throughout central Mississippi began to attract waves of settlers
arriving from east and west. The promise of these emerging frontier communities even attracted
interest among people of Natchez, and over time many enterprising residents of the town
emigrated east to seek prosperous fortunes in farming and lumber.
Whether in the upcountry of the Carolinas or the piedmont of Georgia and Alabama,
southern subsistence farmers evinced similar behaviors and attitudes all through the antebellum
period. Of primary concern to small farmers was the protection of their families and
independence as white citizens in slave society. Despite the disparity in material wealth from
their neighbors to the west, piney woods farmers “asserted their command of liberty and
33
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virtue.”36 Such vigilance existed among many independent farmers, who often displayed a
“communitarian” set of publicly held values. There is a sense, especially among struggling
farmers, that each citizen shared in their neighbor’s hardships and drew strength from the belief
that each member of the community was bound to the next.37 Shared values manifested itself
through house raisings and assistance with crops. More importantly, communitarian values
invoked a sense of civic responsibility to the state, motivating citizens to join in local leagues to
promote political and economic measures, such as road building, levee construction, clearing of
streams and rivers.38 The result of this quasi communalism heightened sensitivity for the overall
good of the community and belief that local matters should be addressed internally, not by
distant governing bodies. But this does not mean that the backcountry of Mississippi was
inhabited by radical dissenters. Too the contrary, much of the political behavior demonstrated by
farmers represented the very essence of the Jeffersonian tradition in American political
economy—self sufficiency.
While communitarian values permeated Mississippi’s population, the stark regional
differences between those living in the interior and those living along the edge of the great river
placed a great deal of strain on Mississippian’s unity. As noted earlier, piney wood residents
possessed a minimal amount of Mississippi’s wealth, and produced a marginal amount of it good
and services, and consequently owned fewer slaves than their neighbors to the west. Naturally,
class tensions played a roll in what became an increasingly antagonistic relationship between the
river counties and counties accounting for the piney woods and New Purchase regions. But
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while class enmity may have contributed to intrastate friction, unforeseen political and economic
disputes ultimately revealed Mississippi’s sectional attitudes.
In 1822 debate over the location of the state’s seat of government emerged as one of the
most public disagreements between Natchez and central Mississippi. Eventually Mississippians
settled the issue, and the centrally located Jackson became the state capital in 1823. The far
reaching economic and political implications revealed intensifying differences of opinion by the
middle of the 1820s. Predictably, the elites of Natchez did not welcome a redistribution of
power in the state’s legislature and feared for their political future. Indeed, the relocation of the
state’s capital signified the potential of the piney woods and New Purchase regions, and
represented a symbolic moment in Mississippi’s brief history as a state.
With an economy largely based on small land holdings the eastern settlements typically
“banded together against the representatives of the old Natchez District on such issues as internal
improvements, banking, and state politics regarding Indians and slaves.”39 Before the emergence
of the eastern settlements, representatives of the river counties, especially Adams County, rarely
experienced any barriers to their political and economic policies. Without any organized
opposition, planters dictated the course of Mississippi’s public affairs before 1823, often
pursuing agendas that benefited local interests above the greater good of the state. The
domineering posture of the river county elites, especially Natchez, continued after the relocation
of the capital, but substantial opposition had risen from the east.
No amount of communitarian values could suppress the escalating tensions between
western and eastern interests in Mississippi by the middle of the 1820s. Questions regarding
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economic development became increasingly urgent as the newly settled interior strived to
achieve a level of prosperity similar to more established settlements along the Mississippi River.
Simultaneously, a lively discourse concerning economic issues began to rise on a national level,
and no doubt impacted the internal clash of Mississippi. It is no coincidence that intrastate
discord began to rear its ugly head in Mississippi during the middle of the 1820s, when the
emergence of a national battle over economic policies, concerns over western expansion, and the
future of slavery began to provoke debate.
National concerns regarding federal support of internal improvements, protective tariffs,
and a national bank coincided with the rise of the second political party system in America.
Following the disputed election of John Quincy Adams in 1824, a discernible political coalition
coalesced around the policies of Adams’ administration, and his temporarily defeated
opponent—Andrew Jackson. The “American System” devised by Henry Clay, and adopted by
Adams, promoted an active federal presence in the construction of roads, canals, and railroads,
connecting the nation through diverse system of transportation systems. Ostensibly the next step
to Alexander Hamilton’s earlier ruminations on American economic and industrial growth, the
American System stressed the protection of international trade, the stabilizing influences of the
Bank of the United States, and the establishment of a national university.
Despite the political stature of Adams and Clay, their economic policies failed to capture
the imagination and support of many Americans. Regardless, after losing the popular vote to
Jackson, Adams achieved his victory in one the most controversial presidential elections in the
nation’s history.
Andrew Jackson’s dubious defeat in 1824 resulted in a ground swell of support,
especially among southerners. Employing the talents of shrewd political strategists, like Martin
22

Van Buren, Jackson cemented his image as the leader of the Democrats and the “people’s”
candidate in the presidential election of 1828. While the Whigs did not formally coalesce as a
national party until 1832, the policies of Adams and Clay in 1824 were identical to those
supported by Whigs in 1832. The political rhetoric surrounding debates between Democrats and
Whigs over internal improvements and the national bank often descended to the depths of
demagoguery, and represent the nation’s first glimpse of modern political behavior.
Unapologetic political campaigning, interest group politics and pandering, trite slogans, and
character assassinations, emerged as an acceptable means of winning the vote. Democrats were
the first to employ such methods, though Whigs later perfected it.
Such class-centric rhetoric was particularly effective as Americans struggled with the
anxiety and impersonality created by industrialization and an intruding market based economy.
Democrats promoted their party as the “party of the people” and castigated the opposition as
representatives of corrupt aristocrats. Historians continue to debate whether, or not, Jacksonians
truly stood for the common American, and if they should be taken at face value as a final barrier
to capitalism and its enveloping effects on American society in the 1830s.40 Regardless, the
class rhetoric, while possibly disingenuous, was no doubt effective.
Furthermore, as uncertainties surrounding national economic programs and a second
political party system began to mount, Americans were also confronted with questions over
western expansion and the future of slavery. By 1824 slavery had been abolished in the North,
but the Missouri Compromise of 1820 made clear that the peculiar institution remained a
fundamental component of the South’s political, economic, and social way of life. Not only was
slavery central to white southerners way of life, it was prospering. The Adams administration
40
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understood all too well that his nationalistic policies and the integration of western states were
encumbered, if not threatened, by the escalating issue over slavery and its perpetuation.
National partisan politics and fears over the course of America’s empire building filtered
downward to the states, often resulting in divisive political battles that revealed pronounced
sectional attitudes on a state level. With national issues such as internal improvements, western
expansion, and slavery now intertwined with state politics, political mobilization and party
discipline took hold as the stakes of state politics continued to rise. By 1824 the elite planters
and financiers of Natchez, now faced with serious opposition to their political and economic
livelihood, prepared to show their hands.
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INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS
By the early 1820s government subsidization of internal improvements emerged as the
most debated issue in Mississippi state politics. While the General Assembly passed a number of
appropriation bills for roads uniting Jackson with numerous regions of the state, most inhabitants
of central and eastern Mississippi recognized that the state’s roads were abysmal. More
importantly the citizens of central Mississippi demanded the improvement of the state’s interior
rivers, especially the Pearl, which promised to open new navigation routes to commercial centers
throughout the region, including New Orleans.
As early as January 29, 1822, the General Assembly agreed to appropriate four thousand
dollars to improve the navigation of the Pearl River, from latitude thirty-one, to its point of
deposit at Lake Borgne, just east of New Orleans.1 Brewster H. Jayne of Lawrence County, an
ardent champion of the act, demanded, “That so far as the said act relates to the improvement of
the navigation of Pearl River, your committee deem it of the highest importance to the interest
and prosperity of a large and respectable proportion of the people of this State.” Jayne envisaged
a direct route of trade from central Mississippi to the Gulf of Mexico and proclaimed, “The
banks of Pearl River will, at no distant day be adorned and beautified with flourishing towns and
villages.”2 The advantages of the Pearl River improvement were manifold.
Economically the project promised to allow accessible, inexpensive, and safe transport of
interior crops to suitable markets by cutting the arduous voyage to New Orleans in half. The
citizens of central-Mississippi could hardly disagree with Jayne’s declaration that, “The
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attainment of these great ends ought to call forth the best efforts of the State, and demand of all
of us the aid which the condition of our fiscal concerns will admit.”3
While the citizens of Jackson and its surroundings enthusiastically anticipated the
prosperity awaiting the region, the elites of Natchez looked on with dismay and recalcitrance.
Edwin A Miles, a scholar of Jacksonian Mississippi, has shown how the merchants of the Old
Natchez District were reluctant to support clearing of rivers and the cutting of roads within
central Mississippi. Wealthy planters and merchants along the banks of the Mississippi fully
understood the risks of subsidizing internal improvements that immediately benefited their
eastern neighbors.4
Residents of Natchez had already witnessed a drain on the political power of the river
counties with the relocation of the state’s capital to Jackson, but improvements throughout the
interior threatened western planters’ and merchants’ monopoly on trade and commerce.
Specifically, the river communities feared that southwestern trade might be diverted to New
Orleans through Lake Borgne and Lake Ponchatrain. Representing two-thirds of the states
taxable property, southwestern planters and merchants were reluctant to relinquish their
economic supremacy for the benefit of the emerging communities of the interior.5
The Monticello Advocate reported that the occupants of the river communities contested
“every measure calculated to improve this section of the country that might afford us facilities to
make use of the natural outlet, and direct the trade, by improving the Pearl River, to N[ew]
Orleans.”6 By 1830 the stubborn resistance of the river planters came as no surprise to central
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Mississippi’s politicians who championed state supported internal improvements along the Pearl
River. Economic and political supremacy continued to rest at the center of western and eastern
Mississippians disputes over the improvement of transportation networks, but Mississippi’s
parochial disagreements began to reflect broader, and more complex, patterns of discord
displayed throughout the South.
Morton Rothstein suggests the sectionalism that persisted throughout the antebellum
South was largely due to a “dual economy,” which polarized wealthy planters and modest
farmers along political and class lines. While cotton planters remained committed to the market
economy, many of the South’s independent producers, less reliant on trade and commerce,
focused instead on subsistence agriculture. The subsistence farmers’ resistance to the
uncertainties of the market was largely based on retaining personal autonomy, fearing the ebb
and flow of market forces might do more harm than good. Living throughout the South, small
farmers eschewed the oppressive nature of a modern economy and the vortex of staple crop
production, preferring instead to maintain a habitual agrarian lifestyle.7
The increased consensus among historians that the emergence of a market revolution
engendered widespread economic, political, and social changes throughout the second quarter of
nineteenth-century America has brought a number of provocative questions to bear on the
antebellum South. Among the most provocative is the assertion that during the 1830s, a strain of
reform-minded southern planters took it upon themselves to integrate the regions subsistence
farmers into the market economy. The historian Harry Watson has asserted that a small, but
influential, group of southern planters sought to confront Dixie’s dilemma of pursuing a modern
economy without cutting ties with the archaic and brutal system of slave labor. For these
7
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forward-thinking planters the promotion of internal improvements represented the most logical
strategy for accomplishing such disparate goals.8
The means of transportation in the United States underwent significant changes after the
War of 1812 and had a profound effect upon the economic and social life of the country. Up
until 1815 the United States had been an agrarian merchant-capitalist economy, dependent on
foreign trade, especially with Europe. The second war with Britain reemphasized America’s
pressing need for economic self sufficiency and ushered in a multitude of economic changes.
Among the most pressing concerns was the need to link commercial markets, improve
communication and national defense, and accelerate the transportation of people and goods.
Turnpikes represented the logical step towards a national transportation system, but interstate
jealousies barred any hope of a truly national system of internal improvements.9
Why did Watson’s reformers focus on internal improvements? First, the construction of
roads, canals, and railroads promised to relieve the South of its financial hardships by further
integrating the regions staple crop industry into national and international markets. Second,
internal improvements may have been linked to the defense of the South’s most embattled
institution—slavery. From the 1820s to the 1850s the same reform-minded planters continually
stressed the benefits of building state systems of internal improvements. Among the planter’s
pressing concerns was the modernization and commercialization of the dual economy.
While slaveholding planters were tied to the market economy, subsistence farmers owned
few slaves, produced few staples, and were isolated geographically from the marketplace.
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Watson suggests progressive planters, mostly Whigs, viewed the dual economy as a threat to the
institution of slavery and targeted internal improvements as a remedy to their problem. As the
argument goes, internal improvements promised to integrate farmers into the market, encourage
staple crop production, create better standards of living, increase slave ownership, and finally
promote greater commitment among independent farmers to take part in and defend the South’s
slave society.10
What is interesting about the sectional disputes over internal improvements in
Mississippi, as opposed to Watson’s study of North Carolina, is the subsistence farming
communities of the interior did not resist the market economy, nor did they object to the
institution of slavery. As already demonstrated, the citizens of central-Mississippi actively
pursued internal improvements to facilitate commerce and trade, and while most inhabitants of
the interior region were primarily small landholders and subsistence farmers, no evidence
suggests that they opposed the staple crop market as modes of suitable transportation became
available.
Neither did the planter elite of the old Natchez District express a will to expand the
market economy beyond their own boundaries. At least throughout the 1820s and early 1830s
the wealthiest Mississippians showed little interest in internal improvements that did not advance
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their own local interests. Furthermore, the inhabitants of central Mississippi did not resist the
opportunity to own slaves and demonstrated no signs of opposition to slavery as an institution.
Nearly two decades later, the morning after he had set foot inside a poor central
Mississippians’ modest home, Frederick Law Olmsted recounted the following conversation.
“Are there many niggers in New York?”
“Very Few.”
“How do you get your work done?”
“There are many Irish and German people constantly coming
…who are glad to get work to do.”
“Oh, and you have them for slaves?”11
The residents of the interior may have owned less of Mississippi’s taxable land and
wealth, yet this reality had not shaken their faith in the South’s peculiar institution by 1850.
Most Mississippians pursued stock raising and cotton cultivation; the latter being
synonymous with prosperity in the South. For the farmers of central-Mississippi, entering the
nascent market economy, not only meant a commitment to staple crops like cotton, but a
commitment to slave labor. One scholar of Mississippi argues, “Through cotton
cultivation…Mississippians consciously strove to touch the web of the market
economy…Producing for the market…allowed them to avoid poverty and to be virtuous
citizens.”12
This particular view of Mississippi’s cuts across the grain of what many historians have
written on subsistence farming communities in the antebellum South. The traditional account
stresses resistance, rather than acceptance, of the pervasive market economy among southern
farmers. According to this interpretation, uncertainty and the complexities of banking and
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finance influenced small farmers to resist the urge for material decency and guard their agrarian
lifestyle. The ethos shared between southern farmers was based on a community of interests
which emphasized family, tradition, cooperation, and self-sufficiency.13
It is unlikely that residents of Jackson opposed the introduction of a market based
economy in central Mississippi, especially when one considers the initial attempt to improve the
Pearl River. To be sure, the citizens of Jackson can hardly be classified as small farmers, but the
outlying communities and counties surrounding Jackson were inhabited by subsistence farmers,
much more so than the developed river counties. Generally speaking, small farmers and small
business owners in central Mississippi supported internal improvements in the state. More
importantly, no evidence suggests the elites of Natchez supported the introduction of canals,
navigable river routes, and passable roads to central Mississippi during the middle of the 1820s.
Rather than promote the expansion of a market economy throughout Mississippi’s developing
communities, the five river counties chose to protect their own economic interests at the expense
of their neighbors to the east.
The national controversy over internal improvement was itself a question of geography.
From the time of Thomas Jefferson up until Andrew Jackson, presidents and congressman were
forced to consider the constitutionality of government funded internal improvement projects.
Federal subsidization of internal improvements forced legislators to ask two fundamental
questions; does Congress possess the authority to appropriate funds to state and local projects,
and how are funds to be divided up?
The phenomenal success of the Erie Canal in New York state demonstrated the potential
of a massive transportation project, but the prohibitive cost of such undertakings had a mitigating
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effect on the enthusiasm of state and federal legislators. The financing of internal improvement
projects and the appropriateness of the federal government’s subsidization of roads and canals
within a single state represented the essence of the internal improvement question.14 The issue of
internal improvements became ensnared in national politics and by the close of the War of 1812
James Madison declared such federally funded projects unconstitutional. Madison, like his
predecessor Thomas Jefferson, favored a constitutional amendment that might clarify the powers
of the national government.
The first significant controversy in the internal improvement story emerged during
Madison’s presidency, when John C. Calhoun proposed his Bonus Bill in 1817. After several
years of recovery following the second war with England, the United States economy began to
reestablish stability, and by 1816 a flurry on land sales, trade, and war taxes resulted in national
revenues of nearly $40 million, and a surplus of $9 million. Calhoun seized on the propitious
opportunity facing the country and proposed a $1.5 million bonus from the National Bank be set
aside for a network of canals and roads throughout the Appalachians, projects to improve the
Ohio and Mississippi river systems, and an expansive road running south through the Atlantic
interior to New Orleans. Calhoun’s proposal echoed the developmentalism of Alexander
Hamilton and Albert Gallatin, and promised to connect the nether regions of the republic to the
already developed eastern seaboard.15
Madison shared Jefferson’s strict constructionist views when considering the
constitutionality of such national projects. Like Madison’s re-chartering of the Bank, the Bonus
Bill highlighted fundamental questions concerning the implied powers of the national
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government. And like his fellow Virginian, Madison preferred a constitutional amendment
which explicitly laid out Congress’s authority to appropriate federal funds for state and local
projects. As one might predict, Madison and Jefferson, approached the internal improvement
question from a philosophical-constitutional perspective, while Calhoun at this time “was no
advocate of refined arguments on the Constitution.” But arguments over broad and strict
construction of the Constitution dominated the early debates over internal improvements,
overwhelming Calhoun’s “plain, good sense.”16
The day before he left office in March 1817, Madison informed Calhoun he was vetoing
the Bonus Bill. He had already brought his Republican orthodoxy under scrutiny by rechartering Hamilton’s Bank; he feared that approving Calhoun’s proposal might permanently
damage his reputation as the Constitution’s “architect” and “expositor.”17
Madison’s veto of the Bonus Bill established a precedent that directly influenced fellow
Virginian James Monroe’s support of a constitutional amendment which clearly outlined the role
of national government--especially its role concerning internal improvements. By the middle of
the 1820s federal support of internal improvements became a central tenet of the National
Republican platform. A recent scholar of internal improvements from the early national period
to the Civil War maintains the Bonus Bill was “the central piece of legislation in the national
campaign for system of internal improvements.”18 Indeed the debates over internal
improvement continued to escalate until 1830 when Andrew Jackson announced his thunderous
veto of the Maysville Road, placing the burden of internal improvements on the states and
private ventures.
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Passed by the House of Representatives April, 1830, the Maysville Road was expected to
be the next westward extension of the National Road beginning in Cumberland, Maryland.
Opponents of the bill noted the latest extension ran only within the state of Kentucky, and asked,
why the federal funds should be applied to a local project. Naturally, questions concerning the
constitutionality of the road multiplied.
Following its passage in the House, the bill successfully navigated the Senate, and
westerners anxiously awaited President Jackson’s final approval. Jackson handed down his veto
despite his Tennessee roots and overwhelming success among western states in the election of
1828. The veto message sent back to the House of Representatives opened with Jackson’s
declaration that he was, “Sincerely friendly to the improvement of our country by means of roads
and canals, I regret that any difference of opinion in the mode of contributing to it should exist
between us.”19 Jackson went on stating, “It is, however, sufficiently definite and imperative to
my mind to forbid my approbation of any bill having the character of the one under
consideration. I have given to its provisions all the reflection demanded by a just regard for the
interests of those of our fellow-citizens who have desired its passage, and by the respect which is
due to a coordinate branch of the Government, but I am not able to view it in any other light than
as a measure of purely local character.”20
According to Jackson, “The question regards the character of the work, not that of those
by whom it is to be accomplished” but “the inquiry will still remain, Is it national and conducive
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to the benefit of the whole, or local and operating only to the advantage of a portion of the
Union?”21
Jackson’s veto of the Maysville Road was consistent with his promise to reform the
national government and protect the rights of common working Americans. Nationalist policies
endorsed by former president John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay, known as the American
System promoted protective tariffs, internal improvements, and centralization of federal power in
Washington, scorned Democrats as potentially harmful to decent, hard working citizens. For
Jackson and the Democrats, the increase in federally funded projects was poisonous. Jackson
argued that while politicians and financiers stood to benefit from the expansion of the federal
powers, the liberty of common farmers and laborers would only suffer. Urging Congress on,
Jackson declared, “The preservation and success of the republican principle rests with us.”22
But Jackson’s veto of the Maysville Road reached beyond the Democrats’ predictable
rhetoric. His obsession with balancing the nation’s budget precluded his signing off on the
House of Representatives plan to appropriate funds from the national treasury. Jackson ardently
upheld the view that a national surplus would make the United States independent of foreign
nations, especially those entangling alliances in Europe. Finally, internal improvement projects
might require increases in taxes, and Jackson did not want to see his working class constituency
adversely affected by additional taxes, especially with his re-election looming in the distance.
Like Madison’s veto of the Bonus Bill, Jackson’s decision to veto the Maysville Road
placed the burden of funding internal improvements squarely on the shoulders of the state
legislatures and private enterprises. But Jackson and the Democrats molded the Maysville veto
into a divisive partisan issue, which later spilled over into the Jackson’s refusal to re-charter
21
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Nicholas Bilddle’s Bank of the United States. By deploying the demagoguery synonymous with
American politics during the 1830s and 1840s, the Democrats cast themselves as, yet again, the
defenders of the common people, while also achieving their economic and foreign policy
objectives all in the spirit of democracy. The Democrats may have harbored sincere misgivings
about the constitutionality of internal improvements or the impact they might have on the
republic and its virtuous farmers and laborers, but political and economic interests played a
substantial role.23
What is perhaps most important about the Maysville veto, especially when considering
how it affected individual states, is the politicization of the internal improvements debate.
Jackson’s veto ostensibly transformed government subsidization of canal and road building into
a partisan issue, and along with his veto of the Bank of the United States, ushered in one of the
most divisive eras in American politics. Democrat’s continual attacks on national works of
internal improvements, as well as, the Bank directly influenced the creation of the American
Whig Party, a party singularly motivated to dethroning King Andrew and his Democrats.
Surprisingly, partisan politics did not greatly influence the debates over internal
improvements in Mississippi. It is not that Democrats and Whigs were not organized in
Mississippi, they were, but geography rather than political allegiances continued to determine
where politicians and editors stood on the improvement of the Pearl River region. Mississippi
Whigs enjoyed overwhelming support among the five river counties, but they disregarded the

23

For the most distinguished monographs and biographies on Andrew Jackson’s presidency, see Arthur M.
Schlesinger, The Age of Jackson (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1945); Robert V. Remini, Andrew
Jackson and Course of American Freedom (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1981); and Robert V.
Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Democracy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1984).

36

national party’s line when it came to internal improvements within their state, choosing to
protect local interests.
By 1830 members of the Mississippi General Assembly still struggled to “remove
sectional jealousies,” and promote “reciprocity…upon which depends the amalgamation and
unity of the different sections of the State.”24 Dismayed by the lack of cohesion to develop a
comprehensive and statewide plan for internal improvements, editors from the interior began to
vent their frustrations in the press. One editor cried “the disparity between the two regions of the
state, as to the money facilities enjoyed, is rendered still more glaring and obvious by their
relative state of improvement.”25 After more than eight years, the interests of the river
communities refused to surrender their economic monopoly. But times were rapidly changing
as, “The East now dates political birth…having an equal number in the U.S. Senate, and the only
representative in Congress: It awakens our surprise to see how long, it has bowed to the
Aristocracy of the West, and been tolled by the knell of imaginary authority.”26
After almost a decade of continued resistance from river counties, advocates of internal
improvements in Mississippi turned to the federal government. Because of the state’s admission
to the Union, Mississippi received three percent of the proceeds of public land sales within its
borders specifically for the purpose of internal improvements. But by 1828 only a fraction of the
proceeds had been received, and opponents of internal improvements devised an alternative plan
for the revenues of public land sales. Instead of funding the construction of roads and canals
throughout the developing regions, opponents of internal improvements proposed investing land
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revenues in the Planter’s Bank of Mississippi in 1831.27 Naturally, the most enthusiastic
supporters of the Bank resided in the five river counties, whose financiers and wealthy planters
stood to gain the most from its operation. But while banking emerged as the most discussed
topic in Mississippi state politics, the fight to improve the Pearl River Valley continued.
The events surrounding a meeting of political leaders from Mississippi, Louisiana, and
Alabama threatened to unseat the Natchez District as the commercial center of the state. In 1834
representatives from the surrounding states met in New Orleans to discuss the prospects of a
railroad that would connect the Gulf South to Nashville, Tennessee. The original plan intended
the railroad to run across Mississippi, west of the Pearl River, into the northwest corner of
Alabama and into Tennessee. The railroad promised to integrate the adjoining states and harness
the commercial and agricultural potential of the Gulf region. By 1836 much of the railroad had
been approved by the state legislatures and construction proceeded—except in Mississippi.28
Not surprisingly the sectional divisions within Mississippi precluded the passage of the
railroad charter in the state legislature. Predictably the river counties, led by Natchez, believed
the regional railroad would draw trade away from the western river counties, inevitably draining
the economic life blood of the region eastward.
In 1833 an editor at the Natchez Courier pondered, “What will Natchez be worth after the
completion of the roads, when more than half its present business will have been diverted to
other towns on the Mississippi?” Speculating on the inauspicious future of Mississippi’s
commercial center, the editor feared “Natchez will have no country around it to preserve it from
becoming what all towns necessarily become when capitalists are not interested sufficiently in its
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prosperity as to devote a small portion of money to works of internal improvements…”29 In 1836
the river counties were successful in scuttling the charter, but by 1837 western Mississippi, most
notably Natchez, had succumbed to outside pressure, and finally voted in support of the
railroad.30
Why after nearly two decades of sectional animosity did the Old Natchez District finally
concede to eastern pressure for internal improvements? One assumption suggests that the river
communities succumbed to the growing population and political influence of Jackson, finally
realizing the futility of their resistance. The elite planters and merchants of Natchez, who
controlled the commerce and trade in the state for decades, could either continue their
intransigence and risk losing everything, or compromise and settle for a piece of Mississippi’s
economic pie.
Evidence suggests that all Mississippians, including those living in the five river counties,
enjoyed growing prosperity, and looked forward to “Flush Times.” In 1835 John A Quitman
wrote, “Land, negroes, and every description of property had [sic] become very valuable here.”31
Growing land sales and liberal credit accommodations by the Planter’s Bank gave further cause
to believe in Mississippi’s promise. It is possible that the overall economic health of Mississippi
gave the planters and financiers of Natchez reason to believe their interest were safe, regardless
of developing markets to the east. And this may be true, but there are other perspectives and
events worth consideration.
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SLAVERY
Economic matters defined Andrew Jackson’s two terms as president. Questions
concerning the national bank and internal improvements dominated debates in Congress,
cementing fierce loyalties within the Democratic, National Republican, and Whig parties, and
ushering in the nation’s first modern era of politics. Vociferous battles raged over the course
and development of nation’s transportation networks, the suitability of a monopolistic national
bank in a presumed age of egalitarianism, and later—once Jackson’s veto sent Biddle’s Bank
asunder—which banks might receive the withdrawn federal deposits, not to mention, how to
appropriate the country’s first national surplus.1
Politically, questions regarding economics revealed the striking disparities and
confounding similarities between “Jackson Men” and those aligned with Henry Clay.
Furthermore, the advancement of universal male suffrage determined the political strategy of all
parties, resulting in national and state campaigning, fomenting a deeply polarized political party
system.2 With so much attention paid to national economic policies and the unrestrained, often
entertaining, political exchanges of the time, it comes as no surprise that the greatest moral
dilemma of antebellum society lay below the immediate vision of statesman and the polity.
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To say the country’s concerns over the institution of slavery completely receded into the
background of western expansion and finance during the presidencies of John Quincy Adams
and Andrew Jackson is a miscalculation. In fact, slavery always aroused contentious debate, but
it may be accurate to claim the late 1820s represents a lull in the public discussion of slavery.
The Missouri Compromise of 1820, in affect, temporarily quelled the troublesome problem of
western expansion and the addition of slave and non-slave states. As long as new territories
were not added to the Union, the question of slavery remained relatively contained within the
geographic boundaries of Clay’s compromise.3
But even with compromise, politicians, journalists, clergyman, philanthropists, and
planters always demonstrated uneasiness with the present state and future of slavery. However,
debates in the 1820s pale in comparison to the debates that ensued in the following decades.
And while the lucid writings of Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, and John C. Calhoun
reveal their prescience, the country as whole failed to anticipate the scale and fury of the slavery
dilemma.
The many political and social changes caused by the market revolution help to explain
why economic concerns, on the surface, overshadowed the issue of slavery during the Jacksonian
period. But increased attention and scrutiny to the effects of economic and social change in the
antebellum South reveal a complex interconnection between the market revolution and slavery.
Determining how slavery influenced the South’s reaction to the market revolution in
America is the focal point of Harry Watson’s essay “Slavery and Development in a Dual
Economy: The South and the Market Revolution.” Watson notes the intensifying defensive
posture of southern planters and politicians by the 1830s, and suggests this defensiveness further
3
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motivated reform minded planters to do away with the South’s dual economy by supporting the
construction of internal improvements in remote corners of the region. As a result, independent
farmers might begin to produce staple crops and participate in the market. Ultimately, reformers
believed, staple crop production and market involvement might result in greater slave ownership
among independent farmers, and consequently, a much broader commitment to the institution
throughout the South.4
As discussed earlier the wealthiest Mississippians, those who owned the majority of
slaves, resisted all attempts to finance the construction of internal improvements in central
Mississippi. However, by 1836 the five river counties conceded to the mounting protests of their
eastern neighbors and finally granted their support to the Nashville Railroad running directly
through the middle of the state. Determining whether or not “defensiveness” over slavery
influenced western planters’ long overdue acquiescence is the focus of this chapter.
Unfamiliar surroundings, frontier living conditions, and the back braking labor
synonymous with cotton planting all contributed to the daily hardships of Mississippi slaves
during the 1830s. Two decades later Frederick Law Olmsted noted the plight of slaves working
in the old Southwest when he wrote, “They are constantly and steadily driven up to their work,
and the stupid, plodding, machine-like manner in which they labor, is painful to witness.”5
While Mississippi’s frontier surroundings shaped the difficult circumstances in which
slaves labored, it also tempted slaves to escape the plantation and vanish into unexplored forests
and swamps. If a slave managed to escape into the wilderness it was unlikely a planter ever saw
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that slave again. This reality only intensified planter’s demand for vigilant overseers and
disciplined slaves. Still, even the most determined overseer could not prevent the occasional
runaway.
In 1834 an overseer by the name of Staunton discovered a starving fugitive slave who
evaded his return to the plantation for several weeks. Staunton recounts bringing the slave back
to his home and providing him with food and provisions. After the fugitive recovered his
strength, Staunton arranged to make a trip to Natchez, where he might return the slave to his
master, no doubt for a handsome reward. While preparing for the trip the slave managed to
create a diversion by asking Staunton’s wife for additional food. Seizing on the opportunity the
slave then “made off” with Staunton’s pistols. Upon discovering the slave’s plot, Mrs. Staunton
called to her husband in a panic. Unfortunately, for Staunton, it was too late; the slave fired a
single shot into his chest leaving him dead. The fugitive fled the violent scene, never to be heard
from again.6
Fortunately for the local slave population the event received no public attention. As a
result no threat of retribution ever materialized. How could such an event go unnoticed?
Mississippi scholar James Libby suggests: “This event can be explained in part as an indication
of the generally violent social atmosphere in Mississippi. Yet the absence of hysteria or outrage
over this crime indicates the confidence among white Mississippians that their control over
society as firm and not in question.”7
When plantation discipline failed, Mississippi’s courts regularly intervened in cases
involving fugitive slaves. White Mississippians demonstrated tremendous confidence in their
legal system when it came to upholding the peace and restraining conflict. Trust in the legal
6
7

David J. Libby, Slavery and Frontier Mississippi: 1720-1835 (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 2004), 79.
Ibid, 79.

43

system became paramount as Mississippians demanded the return of fugitive slaves without
incident and swift punishment for offences, violent or otherwise, against white citizens. For the
good of white society all threats of organized or spontaneous slave insurrections required the
most severe response.8
The confidence Mississippians exhibited in their systems of control is notable,
considering well publicized threats of slave insurrections in Virginia, South Carolina, even in
Mississippi. Nat Turner, who successfully organized the slaughter of several dozen white
citizens in Virginia in 1831, is perhaps the best known account. Despite the horrifying details of
Turner’s revolt Mississippians remained composed and blamed the violent incident on a “flaw in
Virginia’s legal or racial codes, and perhaps the existence of a large free black population.”9
An important intellectual step in how southerners, especially southern statesman, thought
about slavery further fortified Mississippians’ faith. Many southern statesmen confessed
throughout the 1820s that slavery represented a great evil to the nation. But a myriad of national
and local events transformed how southerners viewed slavery and by the end of the decade
public statements reflected such changes.

Writing to his family in Maine, Mississippi senator

Sargent S. Prentiss expressed precisely how southerners felt when he wrote “slavery was a great
evil,” but “a necessary evil.”10
Historian William Freehling writes that, “A society reveals its deepest anxieties when it
responds hysterically to a harmless attack.”11 By the 1830s the South began to show signs of
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anxiety over the present and future state of slavery. Nullification, highly publicized slave
uprisings, and nascent abolitionist movements all contributed to the South’s increasingly
defensive posture. Still, Mississippians remained confident in their systems of control even as
abolitionists cried, “Maintain that no compensation should be given…SLAVERY IS A
CRIME…”12
Despite slavery’s growing number of outspoken detractors, Freehling says, “It must be
emphasized again that most Americans—including most southerners—paid little heed to these
nagging controversies.”13 Whether planters living in Adams or Wilkinson County considered
Staunton’s murder a “nagging controversy” is difficult to judge, but no evidence indicates that
retaliation against a single slave ever transpired. Even so, the confidence and restraint of the
great river planters was soon tested again.
In the spring of 1835 disturbing reports of a rape and murder committed by fugitive
slaves in southwestern Alabama sparked a fury of concern reaching all the way to local
newspapers in Mississippi. While Mississippians were not directly affected by the horror, the
implications of slave attacks on whites—especially white children—surely concerned
neighboring residents. The gruesome details of the case appeared in Wilkinson County’s
Woodville Republican on June 6, 1835 nearly a month after the crimes were committed in
Baldwin County, Alabama. In a statement issued from the Baldwin County Circuit Court, the
politicians advocated the development of expansive transportation networks as a means of promoting the growth of
the cotton market and prolonging—if not—guaranteeing the future of slavery in the South.. What Freehling and
Watson seem to agree on is that few economic and political decisions in the South were made without considering
the effect those decisions might have on the overall health and stability of slavery. William Cooper’s The South and
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undersigned members of the grand jury claimed the offence represented, “one of the most
horrible crimes ever perpetrated.”14
It began with the disappearance of an orphaned sister and her brother, ages twelve and
nine. Suspicions arose when the children failed to return home after departing from their school
late one afternoon. Thereafter a search party spent several days searching for clues to the
mysterious disappearance of the two siblings, and for four weeks the whereabouts of the missing
children remained an enigma to local authorities. Fortunately, a seemingly unrelated separate
case soon revealed clues to the missing children and the dark events which surrounded their
misfortune on that faithful afternoon.15
Weeks after initial reports of the children’s disappearance two unsuspecting young
women on horseback encountered two black men, presumably runaway slaves, who accosted the
women with obvious malice on their minds. As the slaves “sprang” from a nearby thicket, one
of the women lost her mount temporarily, only to reclaim it before her pursuers were able to
react; the second managed to avoid harm altogether. The circumstances of this incident mirrored
those of the missing children, at least in the opinion of local authorities. Certainly the details of
both cases could hardly be ignored; two unsuspecting and vulnerable travelers seized upon
without any apparent cause or motive. How could anyone dispute the, “Suspicions…fixed on
those two slaves?”16
In the course of formal examinations both slaves confessed, separately, to the earlier
murder of the two children. In an extract from the circuit court of Baldwin County the gruesome
details of the crime were laid bare for all to read, including readers of the Woodville Republican.
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The attackers seized the twelve year old girls first, attempting to rape her, but because of the girls
“tender years” the slaves were unable to “accomplish the infernal deed, without the aid of a
knife.” After taking turns raping the screaming child the slaves then attempted to decapitate her
after “piteous attempts to spare her life.” While one held her head the other “cut her throat and
neck to the bone” and then continued to “violate” the desecrated body. The slaves then disposed
of the tortured and mutilated remains, tying it down with bricks and sinking it in a nearby pond.
The nine year old boy received a more immediate yet brutal death, as the slaves crushed his skull
with pieces of brick and then disposed of his body in the same bloody, watery grave which held
his sister. The slaves then returned to their hideaway and remained unsuspected until their
encounter with the two young women on horseback four weeks later.17
Following a guilty verdict the court “pronounced a sentence known to the law,” that is
before “a smothered flame burst forth” and the citizens of Baldwin imposed their own brand of
justice. The court admitted the lack of severity in its final verdict, but “no adequate punishment”
existed and, “Human foresight could not conceive such a crime could be committed…it was a
case above and beyond all law…God and man.” Following their day in court the slaves were
taken hold of by an outraged mob and burned alive within sight of the quiet pond which served
as a final resting place to the young victims.18
Despite the terrifying details captured in the Woodville Republican no public
demonstration ensued in Mississippi. Much like the Staunton affair, the violent murders in near
by Baldwin County failed to provoke public outrage among the state’s slaveholders. However,
reports of a widespread slave insurrection within the borders of the state represented the test to
Mississippians confidence in their systems of control.
17
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In 1835 citizens of Madison County, located north of Jackson, reported a conspiracy to
incite a slave insurrection in the Yazoo and Pearl River region. By 1834 Madison County’s
black slaves dominated its population, and visitors commented that “immense bodies of rich land
are all being converted into cotton fields, and negro quarters—leaving so sparse a white
population.” Most of the owners of the great plantations lived in other counties, even other
states, leaving the day to day operations to overseers. Historian Edwin Miles notes that,
“Reports of a slave insurrection naturally would hold great terror for the white population of this
community…”19
First reports indicated a conspiracy on a regional level, stretching throughout the South.
One account estimated that one thousand men, both slave and non-slave, planned to incite a
widespread insurrection on Christmas Day 1835. Most southern states were implicated including
Mississippi. Weeks after the publication of the first report, a second pamphlet circulated
throughout towns on the Yazoo River and several white citizens claimed to have overheard
slaves discussing preparations for an uprising sometime in late June of 1835. By June 30 a
number of Livingston’s white citizens interrogated several black slaves implicated in the plot.
Each slave understood the severity of the situation and confessed to a revolt planned on
Independence Day. Faced with “torture by the lash” the slaves willingly cooperated with
Livingston’s aroused citizenry and provided names of both black and white suspects. Despite
their cooperation, the slaves were seized by an angry mob and hanged. Shortly after local white
leaders chose a committee of “thirteen of the most respectable citizens of the county”—
primarily wealthy planters—and granted them “with ample authority, to devise means of
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defence, to try, acquit, condemn, and punish white or black, who should be charged before
them.”20
On August 1, 1835 the National Intelligencer reported, “A large meeting of the citizens
of Madison County was held, to deliberate upon the momentous crisis which had arisen at which
it was unanimously resolved that a committee of investigation should be immediately organized,
in the name and upon the responsibility of the whole body of citizens, to use all the necessary
means for ferreting out this nefarious plot, and bringing the offenders to speedy justice.
This committee, thus organized, composed of thirteen of the most respectable citizens of the
county, men of elevated standing in the community for moral worth, integrity, and discretion,
preceded, as soon as possible, to the task at hand.”21
Word of a suspected slave revolt spread throughout the neighboring counties of the
interior. In Hinds County, located just south of Madison, citizens reported, “A dreadful alarm
exists, particularly amongst females”22 What made the events of 1835 so explosive was the
barrage of anti-slavery literature circulated by northern abolitionists during the1830s.
Mississippi slave-owners were not only sensitive to these attacks, but feared that a relationship
existed between anti-slavery propaganda and the insurrection plot in Madison County.
Throughout the South, state legislators and governors denounced abolitionists “who seem
anxious to involve us in all the horrors of servile war.”23
On July 14, 1835, ten days after the alleged slave plot, a public meeting in Wilkinson
County discussed the necessary actions to, “guard against any improper movements or disorders
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among the slaves.” In little over a week word of the alleged plot spread from counties north of
Jackson to the extreme southwestern counties along the Mississippi River, prompting white civic
leaders of one river county to advise all citizens “to be on alert, and adopt such measures, by
appointing suitable patrols or committees of vigilance in their respective neighborhoods, as may
be deemed best calculated to insure safety and good order among the slaves.”24
While some prepared for the worst, others thought the plot greatly exaggerated. Future
Southern Rights vice-presidential nominee John A. Quitman reflected “the excitement that
existed in the upper part of this state last summer, like most other excitements about negro
insurrections, was more that of indignation than fear.”25 One month after the Madison County
scare the Jackson Mississippian reported, “Much more, in one humble opinion, has been said in
the newspapers about a contemplated insurrection amongst the negroes in Mississippi, than
necessary.”26
It should be recalled that by 1834 preliminary plans to construct a railroad system to
connect the Gulf region with Nashville, Tennessee were already underway. Approval for the
project proceeded rapidly, except in Mississippi, where river county leaders strongly opposed
bringing internal improvements to the interior of the state. But by the summer of 1835, the river
counties began to speak out on the many virtues of internal improvements, and the need to
modernize the state’s rail system.
On July 18, 1835 Preston W. Farrar, a candidate for the legislature made a public
announcement to the “CITIZENS OF WILKINSON COUNTY” in the Woodville Republican
declaring, “Opposed at all times myself to internal improvements by the general government as a
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national right, I believe it to be the policy of every state to provide well for itself upon this
subject.” Farrar went on to say, “While upon this subject I will remark that the contemplated rail
road passing from New Orleans to Nashville, Ten, through the center of this state meets my
hearty concurrence, believing it will be of vast public utility, and enhance the value of real
estate.”27
Earlier in June of the same summer similar opinions appeared in the press stressing the
importance and virtues of the Nashville railroad. One citizen pondered, “Can nothing be done to
rouse our citizens to action in regard to an improvement which offers such a valuable retreat to
us during the summer, and which would double the number of our visitors during winter?”28
While a representative for public office stated, “The contemplated Rail Road from New Orleans
to Nashville, Tennessee, would receive my undivided support.”29
Did a relationship exist between the Madison County plot and the river counties’
acquiescence to finally finance internal improvements in the interior, after a decade of staunch
resistance? The timing is certainly suggestive, yet one necessary ingredient is lacking. Going
back to Watson, some reform minded planters in North Carolina considered internal
improvements as the key to modernizing the southern economy, integrating subsistence farmers
into the staple crop market, eradicating the dual economy, and promoting the future of slavery.30
In comparing events in North Carolina to events in Mississippi one must consider
motivating factors. Watson notes the “defensiveness” certain North Carolina reformers evinced
as they stressed the pressing need to modernize and promote slavery in all corners of the South.
The same factors existed in Mississippi, still, the river county planters discouraged internal
27
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improvements, at least until 1835, while modest farmers living to the east longed for the many
advantages navigable rivers and railroads might bring. The motivation of the river counties is in
question.
In 1836, a year after the Madison insurrection scare, the editor of the Woodville
Republican reported on the progress of the proposed charter for the Nashville railroad stating,
“The members from the river counties are almost unanimous in pressing its passage,” and “the
eastern members…are enlisted also from the obvious advantage it would prove to their section of
the country.” The Woodville editor went on to say, “The criminal breaches of the law in the
river counties has almost subverted the order and government of society,” therefore “Every
measure …to restore order, shall have my support.”31
Madison County may have felt the restless spirit of Nat Turner rising, and it is probable
river county planters feared the slave plot in Madison might instigate plots among their own.
Whether or not their concerns motivated others to support the Nashville railroad is uncertain,
probably unlikely. Even after Madison County, Mississippian’s never demonstrated collective
“hysteria” or “outrage,” despite what some editors wrote.32 One or two pronouncements cannot
explain the actions of a whole community.
An explanation as to why the river counties finally granted their support to internal
improvements in central Mississippi, after a decade of intransigence, is not germane to this
study. However, Bradley Bond, a scholar of nineteenth century Mississippi, suggests, “ The
southern social ethic, after all, required that free men submit to neither political nor economic
slavery, and railroads represented access to markets and thus to liberty.” Bond goes on to write,
“Southerners understood the connection between railroad construction and regional economic
31
32

Woodville Woodville Republican, February 13, 1836.
David J. Libby, Slavery and Frontier Mississippi, 79.
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independence. They also believed that railroads, by extending the market economy into places
previously isolated from it, instilled in white residents a deeper affections for the social ethic and
the white cultural homogeneity it bred.”33 But the unequivocal “defensiveness” over slavery,
demonstrated in Watson’s study of North Carolina, never surfaced during a decade long struggle
over internal improvements in Mississippi.

33

Bradley Bond, Political Culture in The Nineteenth-Century South: Mississippi 183-1900 (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 111.
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CONCLUSION
While the ideas expressed in Watson’s essay may not apply to Jacksonian Mississippi,
there are other aspects of his study that do. Watson writes addresses most of the major
historiographic themes scholars continue to debate. As mentioned in the introduction to the first
chapter, the political and economic struggle between the river counties and interior regions of
Mississippi represents a microcosm of southern historiography, touching on capitalism,
sectionalism, and slave agency in the antebellum South. This study offers no final judgment, yet
some conclusions regarding Mississippi during the 1830s are implied.
In contrast to Watson’s study, the wealthiest Mississippians living throughout the five
river counties opposed the funding of internal improvements at almost every turn, while those
living in less developed regions actively pursued the clearing of rivers and railroad construction.
Obviously, river county planters discouraged internal improvements, at least until 1835. Why
those planters and political representatives suddenly decided to endorse the Nashville Railroad is
not certain, but “defensiveness” over slavery in Mississippi, specifically those counties to the
east of Natchez, did not impact any final decision.
Initially, it seemed the conspicuous timing of the Madison slave conspiracy and the river
counties approval of the Nashville Railroad presented an opportunity to demonstrate the
applicability of Watson’s ideas in Mississippi. Furthermore, if one event had anything to do with
the next, then a plausible argument in support of the existence and efficacy of slave’s agency—
and its impact on political and economic decisions—might work. Clearly, neither applies in this
case. However, this does not diminish the virtues of Watson’s work.
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The suggestiveness of Watson’s essay is also its burden. Grand theories afford
professional scholars and students alike, numerous topics of debate. Like the market revolution,
Watson’s essay covers so much historiographic ground that it is left in an intellectually
vulnerable position. Even still, historians relish grand theories—it gives them something to talk
about.
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